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Abstract 
 
Controversies surrounding the European sovereign debt crisis loom prominent in the public 
debate. From a legal perspective, the no-bailout rule and the ban on monetary financing 
constitute the main principles governing the legality review of financial assistance and 
liquidity measures. Interpretation of these rules are full of empirical claims. According to 
conventional legal doctrine, bond spreads only depend on the country’s debt position, largely 
ignoring other causal factors including liquidity. We test the hypotheses implicit in 
conventional legal reasoning. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the 
spreads of the peripheral Eurozone countries was disconnected from underlying 
fundamentals and particularly from a country’s debt position, and was associated rather 
strongly with market sentiments and liquidity concerns. We apply our empirical findings to 
the legal principles as interpreted by recent jurisprudence arguing that application of the no-
bailout principle and the ban on monetary financing should be extended to capture non-debt 
related factors. Also, the empirical results suggest taking recourse to alternative legal grounds 
for reviewing the legality of anti-crisis instruments and allowing for a lender of last resort in 
the euro zone. 
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The EU debt crisis: Testing and revisiting 
conventional legal doctrine 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The turmoil caused by the European sovereign debt crisis in Europe have also 
reached the arena of legal scholarship. The step-wise implementation of anti-
crisis instruments led to lively controversies among legal commentators on the 
legality of these measures. While in the literature the debate has been 
prominent for some time already (for an overview: De Gregorio Merino (2012); 
Steinbach (2013)), on the level of highest jurisprudence the controversy has 
culminated into an open opposition more recently – the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC, 2014) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ, 
2015) have rendered judgments coming to openly different findings on the 
legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) programme programme. 
 
At its core, the legal debate revolves around the interpretation of two legal 
norms laid down in the EU Treaties providing the ground for the legality 
review of EU anti-crisis mechanisms – the no-bailout principle, which prohibits 
the assumption of commitments of another Member State (Article 125 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and the ban on 
monetary state financing through the ECB (Article 123 TFEU). According to 
conventional legal doctrine, both the no-bailout principle and the ban on 
monetary financing aim at ensuring that Member States are held liable for their 
fiscal conduct through market pressure. In this vein, the no-bailout rule 
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prohibits financial assistance because it would undermine fiscal responsibility. 
Similarly, the ban on monetary financing has been interpreted to ensure that 
markets apply their “assessment of creditworthiness and charge higher risk 
premiums if there are doubts about a State’s fiscal behaviour, resulting in 
increased interest rates” (Borger, 2016, p. 4). 
 
Legal interpretation of these norms – both in legal scholarship as well as 
courts’ jurisprudence – is full of empirical claims. In a nutshell, legal doctrine 
assumes a stable and causal relationship exists between a country’s debt 
situation and the corresponding spreads. The doctrine further presupposes 
that only debt matters for a countries refinancing situation, that is no other 
determinants impact a country’s refinancing conditions – liquidity does not 
matter, nor does it affect countries’ refinancing conditions. In addition, there is 
the underlying notion that governments have exclusive control over their 
refinancing situations, as they decide on their deficit conduct, so that non-
market interventions are undesirable.   
 
The legal doctrine of these norms is thus inherently empirical and its claims 
can be re-phrased as testable hypotheses. Against this backdrop, the purpose 
of this paper is to challenge the empirical validity of conventional doctrine as it 
is accepted in parts of legal scholarship and the GFCC’s jurisprudence. The 
goal is to gain insight for an empirically sound interpretation of the relevant 
norms. To that end, we build on empirical literature indicating the fragility of 
the above claims. In De Grauwe (2011a, b), it had been shown that Eurozone 
countries are more prone to sovereign debt crises than non-members of a 
monetary union. And De Grauwe and Ji (2013) studies a range of economic 
fundamentals and how they determine a country’s bond spreads. They show 
how bonds spreads are disconnected from underlying debt parameters during 
the crisis. This conclusion has been confirmed by Saka, et al. (2015). 
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Based on our econometric analysis, we show that conventional legal 
interpretation of the no-bailout principle as well as the ban on monetary 
financing should be revisited in light of the fragility of the empirical 
assumptions. Also, our empirical findings highlight that anti-crisis instruments 
such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the OMT programme 
offer the necessary flexibility to react to deviations from the conventional 
claims on the relation between debt and spreads in times of crisis, which 
supports a re-interpretation of the above norms depending on factors causal 
for bond spreads. Moreover, other legal provisions in the EU Treaties that 
loom less prominent in the discussion, such as the “emergency clause” under 
Article 122 TFEU might capture empirical reality more accurately. Finally, an 
interpretation of EU rules allowing the ECB to act as lender of last resort 
would reduce the impact of non-fundamental factors on bond spreads. 
 
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the legal issues 
surrounding the European debt crisis and identifies the empirical hypotheses 
enshrined in the conventional legal doctrine of the no-bailout clause and the 
ban on monetary financing. Section 3 describes the econometric testing 
procedure and explores the explanatory power of different variables. Section 4 
evaluates the relevance of the empirical results for an interpretation of the legal 
norms. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
II. Legal background  
The different types of anti-crisis instruments have gradually expanded over 
the last few years. Initially, Member States granted bilateral loans to crisis 
countries; then, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created; 
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later, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was added; the European 
Central Bank’s Securities Markets Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases 
since May 2010 and finally the announcement by the ECB that it would 
purchase an unlimited number of government bonds if necessary (OMT 
programme). The ECJ subsequently approved these instruments. In Pringle, the 
ECJ paved the way for the creation of the ESM. Under the ESM, financial 
assistance is exceptionally permitted when such support is “indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member 
States” (ECJ, 2012, para. 142), and the grant of the support is subject to strict 
conditionality (Adam/Perras, 2013). Subsequently, the ECB’s OMT programme 
was brought before the GFCC for allegedly infringing the ban on monetary 
financing. The GFCC referred the case to the ECJ asking whether the EU 
treaties permit the ECB to adopt a programme such as OMT that would foresee 
purchases of government bonds on the secondary market for the purpose of 
ensuring the smooth functioning of monetary policy (GFCC, 2014). While the 
GFCC expressed its doubts as to the compatibility of OMT with the ban on 
monetary financing, the ECJ (in Gauweiler) found the ECB to remain within its 
monetary policy mandate (ECJ, 2015; Adamski, 2015). 
 
The controversy of the two courts is representative both in regard the opposing 
views within legal scholarship more broadly as well as the contradictory views 
on the empirical foundations of their jurisprudence offering a rationale for 
purchasing government bonds or not. This controversy is rooted in the 
meaning (and the underlying empirical assumptions) one gives to the no-
bailout clause and the prohibition of monetary financing and which can be 
traced along the jurisprudence on the ESM (Pringle) and the OMT (Gauweiler). 
These reveal a number of testable empirical claims. The first pertains to the 
causal relationship between the debt position and the bond spreads. The 
interpretation of Articles 123 and 125 TFEU aiming at keeping budgetary 
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discipline is widely shared in legal literature (Borger, 2016; Palmstorfer, 2012; 
Ruffert, 2011). Both the GFCC and ECJ agree in principle of the “telos of 
market pressure” of the two norms begging the question on whether this claim 
holds empirically (ECJ, 2015, para. 61; GFCC, 2014, para. 71).  
 
Second and closely related (but controversial between GFCC and ECJ and 
among scholars) is whether other factors can disrupt the relationship between 
debt and spreads. In this regard, the GFCC found that “such interest rate 
spreads only reflect the scepticism of market participants that individual 
Member States will show sufficient budgetary discipline to stay permanently 
solvent” (GFCC, 2014, para. 71). The GFCC thus rejects the possibility that 
other than debt-related parameters significantly influence the bond spreads 
and that it considers it impossible to identify the justified and excessive parts 
of bond spreads – an analysis that is shared by some legal scholars (Siekmann, 
2015; Ruffert, 2011) but stands in contrast to the findings of a number of 
empirical studies (Poghosyan, 2012; Santis, 2012) as well as the assessment of 
the ECJ. In this respect, the ECJ contradicted the referring court’s argument 
that the premia simply envisage differences in macroeconomic fundamentals 
between various euro area Member States (ECJ, 2015, para. 72). Again, the 
difference in arguments between the courts is empirical in nature – are other 
factors such as non-fundamentals or liquidity reasons really irrelevant for the 
determination of bond spreads as argued by the GFCC? And are the observed 
bond spreads justified or excessive parts of bond spreads? 
 
Third, and connected to it, is the question of control over bond determinants. 
Interpreting Articles 123 and 125 TFEU as to set incentives for states to keep 
their budget in order necessarily requires entire control over the determinants 
of bond spreads by the respective country. The strict ban on interventions 
derived from Articles 123 and 125 TFEU only makes sense if governments keep 
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the determinants influencing the bond spreads under control because 
otherwise the prohibition of intervention would not reach its goal in setting the 
right incentives. This raises an additional empirical question, namely whether 
the factors influencing the bond spreads can be steered by governments, 
especially during times of crisis. 
 
 
III. Empirical part 
 
To analyze the determinants of the interest rate spreads in the EMS and the 
Eurozone, we specify the following fixed-effect econometric model.  
 
Sit = a + bFit + ai + uit         (1) 
 
where Sit  is the interest rate spread of country i in period t. The spread is 
defined as the difference between country i’s 10-year government bond rate 
and the German 10-year government bond rate.  a is the constant term and  ai  
is country i’s fixed effect. The latter variable measures the idiosyncrasies of a 
country that affect its spread and that are not time dependent. For example, the 
efficiency of the tax system, the quality of the governance, the population 
structure and many other variables that are country-specific are captured by 
the fixed effect. Fit is a set of fundamental variables.  A fixed effect model helps 
to control for unobserved time-invariant variables and produces unbiased 
estimates of the “interested variables”. 
 
In the second step, following De Grauwe and Ji (2013), we introduce time 
dummies into the basic model and the specification is as follows: 
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Sit = a + bFit + ai + et + uit        (2) 
 
where et  is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are 
unrelated to the fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed 
effects. If significant, it shows that the spreads move in time unrelated to the 
fundamental forces driving the yields. It will allow us to evaluate the 
importance of fundamental economic factors and time effects. The latter can be 
interpreted as market sentiments unrelated to fundamentals. 
 
The set of economic and monetary variables     include the most common 
fundamental variables found in the literature on the determinants of sovereign 
bond spreads1 are: variables measuring the sustainability of government debt. 
We will use the debt to GDP ratio. In addition, we use the current account 
position, the real effective exchange rate and the rate of economic growth as 
fundamental variables affecting the spreads. The effects of these fundamental 
variables on the spreads can be described as follows.  
 
x When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt 
service increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then 
in turn leads to an increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors 
demand to compensate them for the increased default risk.  We also add 
debt to GDP ratio squared. The reason of focusing on the non-linear 
relationship comes from the fact that every decision to default is a 
discontinuous one, and leads to high potential losses. Thus, as the debt to 
GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come closer to the default                                                         1 Attinasi, M., et al. (2009), Arghyrou and Kontonikas(2010), Gerlach, et al.(2010), Schuknecht, et al.(2010), Caceres, et al.(2010), Caporale, and Girardi  (2011), Gibson, et al. (2011), De Grauwe and Ji (2012), Aizenman and Hutchinson(2012), Beirne and Fratzscher(2012).  There is of course a vast literature on the spreads in the government bond markets in general. See for example the classic Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz(1986) and Eichengreen and Mody(2000). Much of this literature has been influenced by the debt problems of emerging economies. See for example, Edwards(1984), Edwards(1986) and Min(1998). 
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decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the debt to 
GDP ratio (Giavazzi and Pagano(1990)). 
 
x The current account has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account 
deficits should be interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the 
country as a whole (private and official residents).  This is also likely to 
increase the default risk of the government for the following reason. If the 
increase in net foreign debt arises from the private sector’s overspending it 
will lead to default risk of the private sector. However, the government is 
likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a negative effect on 
economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues and an 
increase in government budget deficits. If the increase in net foreign 
indebtedness arises from government overspending, it directly increases 
the government’s debt service, and thus the default risk. To capture net 
foreign debt position of a country, we use the accumulated current account 
GDP ratio of that country. It is computed as the current account 
accumulated since 2000Q1 divided by its GDP level.  
 
x The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be 
considered as an early warning variable indicating that a country that 
experiences a real appreciation will run into problems of competitiveness 
which in turn will lead to future current account deficits, and future debt 
problems. Investors may then demand an additional risk premium. 
  
x Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of 
servicing its debt. The lower the growth rate the more difficult it is to raise 
tax revenues. As a result a decline of economic growth will increase the 
incentive of the government to default, raising the default risk and the 
spread. 
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We run a regression of equation (2) using a sample of the ten original 
Eurozone countries (without Luxembourg) during 2000-2015 (quarterly data).  
After having established by a Hausman test that the random effect model is 
inappropriate, we used a fixed effect model to analyze the long-term bond 
spreads in the Eurozone. Table 1 presents regressions of the Eurozone 
countries using the proposed fixed effect model. 
 
Table 1: Estimation Results on Spread (%) Sample period: 2000Q1-2015Q2 Standard errors in brackets 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Data sources: the government debt to GDP ratio, the real effective exchange rate (defined as the relative unit labour costs), the current accounts and the growth rate of GDP are all obtained from Eurostat. 
 
We find that the fundamental variables have a significant effect on the spreads. 
Increasing government debt ratios lead in a non-linear way to higher spreads; 
a real appreciation of the currency reduces competitiveness and in so doing 
raises the spreads; a decline in economic growth raises the spreads as it 
reduces the capacity of governments to generate tax revenues necessary to 
service the debt. We also find a significant effect of accumulated current 
accounts on the spreads, however, the coefficient has the wrong sign. We 
therefore reject that the accumulated current account deficits lead to an 
increase in the spreads. 
Debt GDP ratio (%) -0.0745*** 
 [0.0111] 
Debt GDP ratio squared 0.0005*** 
 [0.0001] 
Real effective exchange rate -0.7420* 
 [0.4196] 
Accumulated current account GDP ratio (%) -0.4856*** 
 [0.1061] 
Growth rate of GDP -0.2259*** 
 [0.0310] 
Time fixed effects (quarterly) Controlled 
Country fixed effects Controlled 
Number of Observations 620 
Number of countries 10 
R2 0.8662 
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Statistical significance is one thing; economic significance is another one. We 
also want to know what the economic significance is of the fundamental 
variables. Put differently, we want to measure the quantitative importance of 
the fundamental variables in explaining the movements in the spreads.  
 
In order to obtain information on the economic significance of the 
fundamentals we have to compare these with the effect of the time dummy 
variable. An F test confirms that there are significant time components in the 
regression. In order to differentiate the core (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Italy) and periphery (Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) 
Eurozone groups, we assume that the time components of the two groups can 
be different.  We show the estimated time components (associated with the 
regression results in Table 1)  in Figure 1.  It confirms the existence of 
significant time components that led to deviations of the spreads from the 
underlying fundamentals. This time effect is especially pronounced in the 
peripheral countries. In particular we find that in the periphery countries, 
there was a surge of the spreads during the sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 
2012 that was independent of the movements in the fundamentals. In 2012 
there was the OMT-announcement, and we observe that the spreads  decline 
forcefully, again independently of the movements of the fundamentals. Thus, 
it appears that the announcement of OMT by itself, triggered a large decline in 
the spreads that could not be associated with improvements in the 
fundamentals. 
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Figure 1: Time Component of Spread (%) 
 Source: own calculations 
 
The next step in the analysis consists in estimating the contribution of the 
fundamentals and the time dummy in explaining the movements in the 
spreads. We will perform this exercise during two periods. The first one is the 
crisis period, starting from 2008Q1 until 2012Q2 (just before the OMT-
announcement). The second (post-OMT) period runs from 2012Q3 to 2015Q2. 
We show the results in Figures 2 and 3.   
 
We find that during the crisis period, the time dummy is by far the largest 
explanatory factor in explaining the surge of the spreads for Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain. In the case of Greece, fundamentals have a somewhat higher 
importance: they explain 44% of the surge in the Greek spread. 
 
The post OMT-period shows a similar pattern. The time variable explains by 
far the largest part of the decline in the spreads observed since 2012, 
suggesting that the decline in the spreads was made possible mostly by the 
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OMT-announcement. Changes in the fundamentals do not seem to have 
contributed much in explaining this decline. 
 
Figure 2. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to predicted changes in 
spreads % (2008Q1-2012Q2) 
 Source: own calculations  
Figure 3. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies to predicted changes in 
spreads % (2012Q2-2015Q2) 
 Source: own calculations 
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Since the legal arguments focus on the influence of the government debt to 
GDP ratio it will be useful to repeat the previous exercise and to isolate the 
separate effect of the debt to GDP ratio on the spreads during the two periods. 
We show the results of this exercise in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows the 
decomposition during the crisis period 2008-12.  We find that the changes in 
the government debt to GDP ratio observed during that period contributed 
very little to the surge of the spreads. This surge is mainly explained by the 
time dummy, measuring market sentiments, and to a lesser degree by the 
deterioration of the other fundamentals (economic growth and 
competitiveness).  This suggests that the surge of the spreads during the crisis 
was unrelated to the movements of the most important fundamental variable, 
i.e. de government debt to GDP ratio. 
 
Figure 4: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals and time dummy in changin 
spreads (2008-12) 
 Source: own calculations  
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Figure 5 shows the same decomposition during the post-OMT period (2012-
15). Again we find that the changes in the government debt ratio explain only a 
small fraction of the decline in the spreads. This decline is mainly driven by the 
market sentiment variable and by the other fundamental variables, economic 
growth and competitiveness. As the latter improved somewhat they tended to 
reinforce the effect of market sentiments. 
 
Figure 5: Contribution of debt, other fundamentals and time dummy in changing 
spreads (2012--15) 
 Source: own calculations  
In this empirical section we have provided evidence showing that during the 
sovereign debt crisis the surge of the spreads was determined mostly by 
market sentiments, which we measured by time dummies that are 
independent from underlying economic fundamentals.  In addition, we found 
that the changes in the debt to GDP ratios observed during this period had 
practically no influence on the increase in the spreads. Other fundamentals, in 
particular the decline in economic growth and the deterioration of 
competitiveness had some, but relatively small influence. 
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The conclusions from the empirical analysis of the post-OMT period are 
similar. The rapid decline in the spreads during 2012-15 was triggered mainly 
by positive market sentiments, which are likely to have been the result of the 
OMT-announcement. The changes in the fundamentals, and in particular the 
changes in the debt to GDP ratios, had very little impact on the spreads. 
 
These empirical results suggest that the sovereign debt crisis that erupted in 
2010 and that led to spectacular increases in the sovereign bond rates of a 
number of countries was not the result of deteriorating government debt 
positions, but from market sentiments of panic and fear, and to lesser degree a 
decline in growth and competitiveness. Put differently, the surge of the 
spreads during 2010-12 was reflecting market sentiments in which panic and 
fear led investors to massively sell government bonds. These then in a self-
fulfilling way triggered a liquidity squeeze making it increasingly difficult for 
the governments concerned to rollover their debt. 
 
 
IV. Legal implications of empirical findings 
 
The above empirical results offer insight for the legal interpretation of the no-
bailout clause (Article 125 TFEU) and the ban on monetary financing (Article 
123 TFEU). A number of legal inferences can be made from the empirical 
analysis as to the scope of these norms and their application to review the 
lawfulness of EU debt crisis instruments. 
 
First, the conventional interpretation of the no-bailout principle and the ban on 
monetary financing assuming a stable and causal relationship between a 
country’s debt position and its refinancing possibilities should be rejected. This 
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applies particularly in times of crises, when the impact of debt indicators 
become marginal (and even have an ambivalent effect). A purely debt-focused 
interpretation of these norms is thus not in line with empirical evidence. 
 
Second, market fears become a predominant driver of spreads in times of crisis 
highlighting the relevance of liquidity issues. This implies that interpreting 
Articles 123 and 125 TFEU as enforcing a market logic through strict 
application of these norms without considerations to liquidity and other non-
debt related indicators does not capture the multiple factors causing a 
country’s refinancing difficulties. Rather, the dominance of liquidity concerns 
as drivers for government spreads underscores that a lender of last resort is 
necessary to intervene in times of liquidity dry-up (De Grauwe, 2011b; 
Steinbach, 2016). This should particularly be reflected in the interpretation of 
Article 123 TFEU governing the ECB’s scope for interventions. The prohibition 
of monetary financing should not apply to situations where liquidity (not 
solvency) is the driving force. Similar to the no-bailout rule, the ban’s intention 
to maintain market pressure must be assessed in light of the factors impeding 
the smooth functioning of monetary policy – this extends to unjustified 
spreads due to market sentiments as shown above. 
 
Third, the conventional interpretation of the above norms presume a country’s 
control over the parameters causing certain spread patterns. In that view, 
market pressure preserved through strict prohibition of bailouts ensure proper 
incentives to solid economic policy. This view should not only be rejected 
given the marginal relevance of debt for spreads. Also, other fundamentals are 
of limited relevance and often they cannot be directly influenced, as 
competitiveness (e.g. wage bargaining) and economic growth depend heavily 
on factors outside of a government’s reach. In addition, liquidity shortages 
reflecting market fears are disconnected from government’s policy influence. 
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Fourth, an interpretation of the above norms allowing account for non-debt 
related parameters (and particularly for liquidity concerns) suggests the 
lawfulness of the policy instruments adopted to counter liquidity shortages, in 
particular the ESM and the OMT programme. Both of these measures have 
been setup to address the above phenomenon of liquidity shortages. However, 
in its judgment on the OMT programme, the GFCC relied on the the argument 
made by the German Bundesbank, according to which it is impossible to 
“divide interest rate spreads into a rational and an irrational part” (GFCC, 
2014, para. 71). In the proceedings, the Bundesbank had criticized the 
unfeasibility of determining to what extent risk premiums reflect economic 
fundamentals or other factors. The above empirical analysis rejects this point 
of view and rather supports the ECB’s intention to restore regular monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms by neutralising unjustified interest spreads on 
government bonds. Thus, an empirically sound legal assessment should 
consider both nature and scope of factors underlying bond spreads. The ECJ’s 
interpretation of Article 123 TFEU to accept unjustified interest rates to hamper 
monetary policy even if potentially lifting budgetary pressure is in line with 
above demonstration of empirical findings. 
 
Fifth, further legal inferences can be drawn as to the appropriate legal basis for 
reviewing the legality of crisis tools. As mentioned above, the scope of no-
bailout principle and the ban on monetary financing have to be widened 
abandoning a purely debt focus and making the application of these norms 
dependent on non-debt related parameters. Moreover, Article 122 TFEU (the 
so-called emergency clause) might capture the empirical reality more 
accurately than the no-bailout principle. This provision allows a bailout 
activity of the EU via financial assistance “where a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural  
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disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control …”.2 This legal provision 
offers leeway in taking into account a variety of factors going beyond the debt 
focus of Article 125 TFEU. More specifically, liquidity issues impeding a 
country’s refinancing ability may then be considered in times of crisis as 
“exceptional occurrences” within the meaning of this norm. Also, the norm’s 
requirement of “beyond its control” is respected where market sentiments are 
entirely disconnected from fundamental as shown above. The emergency 
provision should thus be interpreted as allowing financial assistance in case of 
temporary liquidity problems (von Lewinski, 2011). 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Controversies surrounding the legality of financial assistance to countries in 
crisis have loomed prominently over the last few years. However, both legal 
analysis as well as relevant jurisprudence rarely (or insufficiently) care about 
the validity of the empirical claims underlying their legal findings. This 
analysis sought to fill this gap and discuss the most relevant norms governing 
the debt crisis in the euro zone by testing the empirical hypotheses implicit in 
the conventional legal doctrine, which heavily relies on the relationship 
between a country’s debt position and the spreads.  
 
Our econometric study has highlighted the fragility of the legal reasoning and 
suggested a re-interpretation of the relevant norms. Most importantly, a legal 
regime governing the lawfulness of financial assistance cannot be limited to 
debt parameters but must consider the impact of other fundamentals on                                                         2 (emphasis added). This exception was used as a legal basis for the EFSM Regulation 407/2010. The EU viewed that the difficulties within the meaning of Article 122 TEU may be caused by a serious deterioration in the international economic and financial environment, see Regulation 407/2010, paras. 2-5. 
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spreads and, in particular, the liquidity situation as a result of market 
sentiment. Taking into account non-debt related factors suggests an 
application of the no-bailout principle and the ban on monetary financing to 
the effect that crisis instruments allowing liquidity supply (OMT) and financial 
assistance (ESM) can empirically be justified and should be considered lawful. 
Future application of legal standards should incorporate the emergency clause 
laid down in Article 122 TFEU as legal basis for exceptional financial assistance 
to account for factors out of a country’s control causing financial distress (e.g. 
extreme market fears), which a narrow interpretation of the no-bailout 
principle is unable to capture. Finally, the ban on monetary financing (Article 
123 TFEU) should be interpreted as compatible with the ECB acting as lender 
of last resort in order to reduce the impact of non-fundamental impact on 
government spreads.   
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